

# IDNs and its possible bad uses

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**fladnaG (Max)** French independent Pentester/Trainer/Sysadmin BalCCon 2k22

@fladna9 on Twitter

pro@fladnag.net



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# Disclaimer

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- Don't have the dumbs like me.
- What will be presented here may be considered illegal in many countries, and may send you to jail.
- This is not a point-and-shame presentation.
  - This technique is not prevalent yet, but seen more and more each year.
  - The goal here is to demonstrate it can happen to anybody.



# Plan

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- Quick introduction to Domain Names
- What are IDNs?
  - Punycode?
- Let's play a game >:)
- Attacks in the wild
  - Some historical examples
  - My IDNs homograph attacks
- How to protect ourselves?



# Quick introduction to Domain Names

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# Once upon a time...

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## RFC 608 – Jan 1974 HOST NAMES ON-LINE

`<basic-part>.<attribute-item><eol>`

- `<basic-part>` is up to 48 chars, `/^[A-Z][A-Z0-9\-[A-Z0-9]$/i`
- `<attribute-item>`

SERVER, USER, TIP, UNKNOWN

- HOSTS.TXT file shared via FTP...

## RFC 882 + 883 – Nov 1983 DOMAIN NAMES

- Concept and facilities  
Explaining the rationale behind DNS.
- Implementation and specifications.  
Technical specifications.

*Name servers and resolvers must compare labels in a case-insensitive manner, i.e. A=a, and hence **all character strings must be ASCII** with zero parity*  
-- RFC 883


## RFC 1034 + 1035 – Nov 1987 DOMAIN NAMES

- Update from RFC882 and RFC883.
- The basis of what we call DNS today.
- Many features were brought in since then... we'll see one or two.

# DNS

## Domain Names System

- Mainly translate domain names into IP addresses (A for IPv4, AAAA for IPv6), but also for mails (MX), configuration (DKIM, DMARC, SPF, SOA), text (TXT), etc. These are called records organized as a tree-based search and consultation.
- **www.bestrakija.com** (read from right to left) → Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)
  - **COM** is a label, the TLD (Top Level Domain).
  - **BESTRAKIJA** is a label, is a domain.
  - **WWW** is a label, a sub domain.
- Labels are ASCII encoded chars as seen before.
- Distributed protocol via recursive servers UDP port 53.



# DNS

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## Vocabulary

- Registry
  - Company/foundation/administration governing the TLD.
- Registrar
  - Company where end users can register domain names to the Registry as « first asked first served » policy. It's like a Registry proxy, as many Registries don't allow direct domain reservation.
- Registrant
  - Individual/company/foundation/administration registering a Domain Name through a Registrar to the Registry.

# So what?

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## Domain Names are old but it works

- At least, it works well for ASCII-based languages...
- But the problem is: ARPANET became INTERNET, with many countries and languages.
  - Except for English-speaking countries, ASCII is no longer enough to support all the planet.
- So how to satisfy everybody and every language, allowing regional chars in domain names without breaking everything?



# What are Internationalized Domain Names?

[illegible]

# Once upon a time (again)...

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## « Houston, we have a problem »

- March 1998: Singapore University  
Aware of the all-ASCII problem, working on it.
- July 1998: APNIC creates a working group, called iDNS.
- 1999: tests done on .cn domains with Chinese traditional characters.
- 2000: IETF and ICANN get involved, IDN working group created.

## RFC 3454, 3490, 3491, 3492 – in 2003 Internationalized Domain Names

- Encoding function and syntax.  
Called IDN2003
- June 2003: ICANN publishes its IDN guidelines for Registries.
- Updated in 2008.  
Called IDN2008

# What are IDNs?

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## How to make it work?

- Without changing current Domain Names systems, requiring ASCII [A-Za-z0-9\\_]...
- If only there was a **UNI**versal way to en**CODE** all characters from all languages in the world...

# Punycode

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# What is punycode?

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Standardized in RFC3492, Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode for Internationalized Domain Names in Application (IDNA)

- Thanks to bootstring, an algorithm designed to encode Unicode characters in ASCII, we can name a domain with Unicode.
- Bootstrap is
  - Simple, efficient and quick,
  - Unique and Reversible,  
 $\text{ASCII} = P(\text{UNICODE})$   
 $\text{UNICODE} = P^{-1}(\text{ASCII})$
  - Readable as ASCII and UNICODE (next slide).

# Punyencoding with bootstrap simplified

`xn--<ASCII .. -><punycod>`

- IDN punycoded domains will start with `xn--`
- Then ASCII part
  - If there is one, ended with `-`
  - If not, no ending dash
- Then punycode
  - Encoding is rather easy, for each non-ASCII char,
    - `i` = position
    - `n` = UNICODE numeric - 127
    - ASCII encoded result = `EnhancedBase36(i*n)`
  - Decoding is a finite state machine
    - Not going to talk about it, no more math today

How it looks?

UNICODE	ASCII Punycoded
Aerodrom-Nikola-Tesla-Beograd	Aerodrom-Nikola-Tesla-Beograd
Аеродром-Никола-Тесла-Београд	xn--5cdbbbsdiced2b6ardlvrbfj5acsu1a
Aéroport-Nikola-Tesla-Belgrade	xn--aroport-nikola-tesla-belgrade-buc
🚩	xn--h4hx200o
日本語。JP	xn--wgv71a119e.jp

# Top level domain IDN support

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## **.com registry (Verisign, inc., commercial)**

- Many Unicode sub-charsets allowed, but you have to choose an alphabet
  - Latin, Japanese, Vietnamese, Chinese, Cyrillic, etc.
  - For example, cannot combine ASCII with Cyrillic...
  - ... but sometimes with exceptions, including strange chars.
- Many documents, hard to search and read through.


[https://www.verisign.com/en\\_US/channel-resources/domain-registry-products/idn/idn-policy/registration-rules/index.xhtml](https://www.verisign.com/en_US/channel-resources/domain-registry-products/idn/idn-policy/registration-rules/index.xhtml)

## **.fr registry (AFNIC, fundation)**


- Charset defined clearly in Naming Rules document
  - a, à, á, â, ã, ä, å, æ, b, c, ç, d, e, è, é, ê, ë, f, g, h, i, ì, í, î, ï, j, k, l, m, n, ñ, o, ò, ó, ô, õ, ö, ø, p, q, r, s, t, u, ù, ú, û, ü, v, w, x, y, ý, ÿ, z, ß, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, -
  - Very restricted, to french chars + historical local languages (corse, breton, alsacien, lorrain, gascon, provençal...)

# Web browser support

## Google® Chrome® (🔒)



## Mozilla Firefox (🔒)





# Let's play a game >:)

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# Rules

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## Guess game

- 2 chars. 2 types.
- Guess which is which.
- Ready?


For your information, nothing to win, ok? Except maybe a beer.

# Round 1/5

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Cyrillic (UNICODE) versus Latin (ASCII)  
Which is which?

Aa vs Aa




# Round 1/5 - Answer

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Cyrillic (UNICODE) versus Latin (ASCII)

Aa<sub>scii</sub> vs Aa<sub>cyrillic</sub>




# Round 2/5

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Greek (UNICODE) versus Latin (ASCII)  
Which is which?

j vs j




# Round 2/5 - Answer

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Greek (UNICODE) versus Latin (ASCII)

j<sub>(ASCII)</sub> VS j<sub>(greek)</sub>




# Round 3/5

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Latin Extended (UNICODE) versus Latin (ASCII)  
Which is which?

ï vs li




# Round 3/5 - Answer

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Latin Extended (UNICODE) versus Latin (ASCII)

İ (latin extended) VS li (ASCII)






# Round 4/5

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Diacritic (UNICODE) versus Latin (ASCII)  
Which is which?

▪ VS ♦




# Round 4/5 - Answer

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Diacritic (UNICODE) versus Latin (ASCII)

■ (ASCII) VS ◌ (diacritic)




# Round 4/5 - Answer

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Diacritic (UNICODE) versus Latin (ASCII)  
Diacritic is an accent, a combining character.

rakija. (ASCII) VS rakija (diacritic)




# Round 5/5

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No help. It's too easy.  
Which is which?

I vs I




# Round 5/5 - Answer

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No help. It's too easy.

l (lowercase L) VS I (uppercase i)





# Wake up, Neo...

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## Game TL;DP (Too Long;Didn't Play)


- Sometimes hard to recognize one charset to the other with naked eye.
- Also, people may not understand that u and ü are different domains, so possibly illegal sites.
- So, are attacks possible? We'll see about that.

## Typosquatting, homograph and similar attacks on domains typo

- Typosquatting is the generic term for cybersquatting and brandjacking with domain names. Techniques used:
  - Bad spelling,
  - Plural instead of singular,
  - A different TLD/ccTLD,
  - **Homographic attacks, using with different alphabets to have same or similar looking websites.**
- Comboscutting: appending an arbitrary word on a domain that may seem appropriate/logical.
- Doppelganger domain: fusionning two domain labels into one.

# Some historical homograph attacks in the wild

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




# apple.com – cyrillic a

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
Xudong Zeng, 14th of April 2017



# M1cr0\$0ft Outlook vulnerability

## DobbyWanKenobi, 2021

- Imagine you have your good friend, Jean Bon, email [jean.bon@mycompany.onmicrosoft.com](mailto:jean.bon@mycompany.onmicrosoft.com) in your address book.
- The code thingy linking an address book's contact to a mail 'simplifies' some accentuated chars.
- Meaning that if you receive a phishing email from [jean.bon@mycompany.onmicrosoft.com](mailto:jean.bon@mycompany.onmicrosoft.com), it will link it to your good friend in your address book, Jean Bon, which it is not.



# What about bad guys?

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# APWG – Anti phishing working group

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## Status – APWG report from 2016 (last one with an IDN section)

- Phishers don't seem to be interested a lot in these, even though the occurrence of IDNs homograph seem to increase a bit.
  - Phishers are right: many people don't check the FQDN of a phishing page, as long as email + landing page seems convincing.
- My guess: as more and more people will be cautious about domains, these attacks will be used a lot more.



## Examples

- From 2007 to 2014
  - Only 9 real homograph attacks.
- In 2015
  - xn--paypl-680b.com aka **paypal.com**
- In 2016
  - About 185 IDNs used for phishing.
  - 2 real homograph attacks:
    - xn--fcbook-wta9d.com aka **fâcêbook.com**
    - xn--arbnb-b4a.com aka **ajrbnb.com**


# PayPal – since mid 2000s

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Look again above, it is paypal (capital i)

- Created in mid-2000.
  - Reused in 2011, 2012, 2017, 2020
- Phishing to get credentials.
- Website registered by a company named Network Solutions, to a certain Birykov in Russia.

Screenshot credit to u/xellos30 on Reddit



# assurance-maladie.fr, 06/09/2022

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## LI and li, again. Probably against French citizens.



### Domain WHOIS

- Registrar : AMEN / Agence des Médias Numériques
  - Created Date: July 9, 2022 11:07:18 UTC.
  - Updated Date: Sept 7, 2022.
- Holder : Restricted access
  - Administrative contact : Restricted access (Thanks GDPR).
  - Technical contact : AMEN France.

### IP Whois


- Sept 6: Russian hosting provider solutions, so not an official website...
- Sept 7: Digital Ocean.
- Server no longer responding...
  - Was showing an auto-index with many PHP pages and frameworks.

Guessing domain is on hold/seized due to the alert





# Attacker/pentester toolboxes



## IDN Homograph + Lazy? EvilURL!

- IDN generator for a domain name of your choice, noice.
- Can also be used to detect homograph attacks on your domain.

```
[*] Domain name: undeadsec
[*] Char replaced: ['e', 's', 'd']
[*] Using Unicode: ['e', 's', 'd']
[*] Unicode number: ['Cyrillic Small Letter Ie', 'Cyrillic Small Letter Dze', 'Cyrillic Small Letter Komi De']
[*] Evil URL: undeadsec.com
[*] Connection test: DOWN

[*] Domain name: undeadsec
[*] Char replaced: ['a', 'c', 'e', 's']
[*] Using Unicode: ['a', 'c', 'e', 's']
[*] Unicode number: ['Cyrillic Small Letter A', 'Greek Lunate Sigma Symbol', 'Cyrillic Small Letter Ie', 'Cyrillic Small Letter Dze']
[*] Evil URL: undeadsec.com
[*] Connection test: DOWN

[*] Domain name: undeadsec
[*] Char replaced: ['a', 'c', 'e', 's', 'd']
[*] Using Unicode: ['a', 'c', 'e', 's', 'd']
[*] Unicode number: ['Cyrillic Small Letter A', 'Greek Lunate Sigma Symbol', 'Cyrillic Small Letter Ie', 'Cyrillic Small Letter Dze', 'Cyrillic Small Letter Komi De']
[*] Evil URL: undeadsec.com
[*] Connection test: DOWN

[*] Domain name: undeadsec
[*] Char replaced: ['c', 'e', 's', 'd']
[*] Using Unicode: ['c', 'e', 's', 'd']
[*] Unicode number: ['Cyrillic Small Letter A', 'Greek Lunate Sigma Symbol', 'Cyrillic Small Letter Ie', 'Cyrillic Small Letter Dze', 'Cyrillic Small Letter Komi De']
[*] Evil URL: undeadsec.com
[*] Connection test: DOWN
```

## Evil reverse proxy + Lazy? EVILGINX!

- Custom Nginx for MiTM, getting session cookies, bypass bad 2FA (SMS, mail, OTP)

```
root@debian-evilginx:~/tools/evilginx2# ./build/evilginx -p ./phishlets/

Evilginx
no nginx - pure evil
by Kuba Gietzky (@gretzky) version 2.0.0

[08:23:56] [inf] loaded phishlet 'google' from 'google.yaml'
[08:23:56] [inf] setting up certificates for phishlet 'google'...
[08:23:56] [inf] successfully set up SSL/TLS certificates for domains: [accounts.it-is-almost-done.evilginx.com apis.it-is-almost-done.evilginx.com ssl.it-is-almost-done.evilginx.com content.it-is-almost-done.evilginx.com]
[08:23:59] [inf] [0] new visitor has arrived: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/66.0.3359.181 Safari/537.36
[08:23:59] [inf] [0] landing URL: https://accounts.it-is-almost-done.evilginx.com/signin/v2/identifier
sessions
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | phishlet | username | password | tokens | remote ip | time |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 19 | google | | | none | 10.10.10.10 | 2018-05-28 08:23 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

[08:24:22] [inf] [0] Username: [10.10.10.10@gmail.com]
[08:24:29] [inf] [0] Password: [10.10.10.10]
[08:24:43] [inf] [0] all authorization tokens intercepted!
[08:24:41] [inf] [0] redirecting to URL: https://redirect-to-this-url-after-logging-in.com
sessions
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | phishlet | username | password | tokens | remote ip | time |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 19 | google | 10.10.10.10@gmail.com | 10.10.10.10 | captured | 10.10.10.10 | 2018-05-28 08:24 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

# My experiences with IDNs homographs

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# A bad idea later...

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In a cold December night, in 2019...

- During a phone call with a friend, we wanted to use stupid homograph attacks to make a demo website for our students/trainees to learn about this kind of attacks, as it may be powerful for spear-phishing attacks and is not well known/not a lot used for now.
- What could be a good and impacting demo for our French participants?
- Must be a domain name every French knows.

Looking at AFNIC's Naming Policy at the time (changed since then)

- Version 25th of May 2018

*Article 2.5 - L'extension « .gouv.fr »*

34. L'extension « .gouv.fr » est réservée au gouvernement français.

35. Les justificatifs nécessaires à l'obtention du code d'autorisation sont :

- ✓ Un identifiant au répertoire SIRENE ou tout autre document officiel permettant d'identifier l'entité et,
- ✓ La validation du Service d'Information du Gouvernement (SIG).

Nothing about IDNs, right?

# göuv.fr aka xn--guv-sna.fr and göüv.fr aka xn--gv-fkay.fr

---

## Additional information

- Gouv was not a « restricted » term.
  - A « restricted » terms (extremism, racism, administration etc.) must follow some rules and are subject to approval.
- Cannot have a name too close to administration, except if:
  - Good will: *white hat sec engineer*,
  - Legitimate interest: *trainings/demos in cybersecurity*.

When you say "Bonjour"  
instead of "Hello"



# What i've done...

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... not to end up in jail.

- Static HTML page explaining the attack.
- HTTPs with Let's Encrypt:
  - impots.göuv.fr
  - defense.göuv.fr
  - interieur.göuv.fr
  - ...
- Way of contacting me on the page.

```
MERCI DE LIRE CET ENCADRÉ - IMPORTANT
Ce site est réservé à titre de démonstration. Ce site n'est pas et n'a aucune relation avec le
gouvernement Français et le nom de domaine 'gouv.fr'.

Ce site est encore en travaux et en cours de rédaction. Cette page sera mise à jour
régulièrement.

>>> Foire Aux Questions <<<
Avez-vous cliqué sur un lien dans un email pour arriver sur ce site ?
Si c'est le cas, regardez bien la barre d'adresse de votre navigateur. Le nom de domaine n'est pas
'gouv.fr' comme vous pourriez vous y attendre, mais 'göuv.fr' (ou 'göüv.fr') avec la lettre 'ö tréma'
aussi appelée 'ö umlaut' (et possiblement 'ü tréma' aussi appelé 'ü umlaut').

Comment est-ce possible ?
Depuis 2012, l'AFNIC (qui est en charge des extensions en .fr) autorise les noms de domaine
internationalisés (IDN) avec des caractères spéciaux. Ces caractères sont des caractères de la langue
française ou de langues régionales.

En soit, cela ne pose pas de problèmes, et c'est même très bien que l'on puisse utiliser les
caractères accentués dans des domaines français (limité à quelques caractères seulement), ou des
systèmes d'écriture/alphabets entiers correspondant à celui du site visité (N'ko, cyrillique, grec,
arabe, hébreu, katakana, thaï, etc.), mais il est parfois possible de réserver des noms de domaines
proches de sites existants. Parfois, c'est visible et parfois, c'est subtil.
```

# ...and what happened

## 31 of March 2021 (about a year and a half in)

- Contacted by ANSSI (French ITSec authority) via Twitter DMs, then exchanging by GPG emails.
- Asked me to destroy my two domains. Which i did, no jail is good.
- Changed the French law, no longer possible to do without risking jail time.
- Still on archive.org :)




## Destruction anticipée

Je soussigné(e), propriétaire du ou des nom(s) de domaine ci-dessous, demande par la présente à Gandi de supprimer ce(s) domaine(s) de sa base de données. J'ai bien noté que :

- la présente procédure est réservée aux cas où la destruction doit intervenir avant l'expiration naturelle du nom de domaine ;
- la présente destruction anticipée n'ouvre droit à aucun remboursement ;
- le délai de destruction définitive dépendra du registre concerné selon l'extension du domaine et non de Gandi.

Domaine(s) (en lettres capitales) : XN--GUV-SNA.FR - GÖUV.FR  
XN--GV-FKAY.FR - GÖÜV.FR



# Demonstration

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# bestrakija.com

I love rakija.



not all rakija btw, but medovina and šljivovica 🤪 🤪 🤪

- So I created the now world famous **bestrakija.com**, as a standard ASCII domain for the sake of the demonstration.
  - Buy your favorite rakija today...  
... except this is not a real eshop.
  - Wordpress + Woocommerce plugins on a dedicated VPS.
- **But also two homograph IDNs.**
  - And another 🚩 dedicated VPS.
- **Let go to the demo.**




<https://menu.bestrakija.com/>

BEST  RAKIJA



# bestrakija.com


## Legitimate connection



## 🇷🇺 connection



# bestrakíja.com in browsers





# bestrakíja.com in emails

---

Offensivity @slashcrypto, 2019	Detectable when reading Mail	Detectable when replying to Mail
Outlook for Windows	NO	NO
Outlook for Mobile	YES	YES
Office365 Web	NO	NO
Gmail Web	NO	YES
Gmail Android	NO	NO
IMail (Mobile)	YES	YES
Thunderbird	NO	NO

# bestrakija.com in Roundcube


The screenshot displays the Roundcube webmail interface. On the left, the 'Inbox' sidebar shows a list of emails, with the selected email 'Re: Test Gmail Android' from 'Fred' (Today 18:01) and a sub-entry '[GANDI] Bienvenue' from 'hello@bestrakija.com' (Tue 16:58). The main panel shows the email details for '[GANDI] Bienvenue' from 'hello@bestrakija.com' on 2022-09-13 16:58. The email body contains the text: 'Bonjour, Bienvenue dans votre nouvelle boîte mail Gandimail !'. The 'To' and 'Reply-To' fields both show 'hello@bestrakija.com'. The 'Subject' field shows 'Re: [GANDI] Bienvenue'. The 'Reading' label is positioned to the right of the email details, and the 'Replying' label is positioned to the right of the email body.

Preview


Reading

Replying

# bestrakíja.com in SOGo




## Replying



# bestrakíja.com in Tutanota


Preview



Reading

Replying


# bestrakíja.com in Thunderbird



Preview

From hello@bestrakija.com <hello@xn--bestrakja-m5a.com> ☆  
Subject **Test Thunderbird and Roundcube**  
To Me★  
Hello, i'm the real Best Rakija. Trust me. Please.

Reading




Replying

# bestrakíja.com in Outlook Desktop

---

FROM	SUBJECT	RECEIVED
Date: Today		
hello@bestrakija.com	Test Microsoft	Fri 9/16/2022 5:26 PM
Hello, i'm the real Best Rakija. Trust me. Please. <end>		

Preview




Reading


Replying

# bestrakíja.com in Windows 10 Mail app


Preview



Reading




Replying



# bestrakíja.com in Office 365 webmail

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# bestrakíja.com in Protonmail webmail

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Preview

hello@bestrakíja.com  
Test Protonmail  
Yesterday

Reading

**Test Protonmail**

From hello@bestrakíja.com <hello@xn--bestrakja-m5a.com> Yesterday  
To fred [redacted]

Re: Test Protonmail


From fred [redacted]  
To hello@xn--bestrakja-m5a.com CC BCC [redacted]  
Subject Re: Test Protonmail

Replying

Hello, i'm the real Best Rakija. T

# bestrakíja.com in Skiff webmail

Preview




Reading

Replying


# bestrakíja.com in Mailfence webmail

Preview




Reading

Replying



# bestrakíja.com in Nextcloud webmail

Preview




Reading

Replying

# bestrakíja.com in Gmail webmail

**Preview**




**Reading**

**Replying**



# bestrakíja.com in K9-Mail

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Preview




Reading



Replying

# bestrakíja.com in Protonmail mobile app


---



# bestrakíja.com in Gmail app

Preview

Reading




Replying



# bestrakíja.com in Canary Android


Preview



Reading


Replying

# bestrakíja.com in Canary iOS



# bestrakíja.com in Apple Mail iOS

Preview




Reading

Replying

# bestrakíja.com in Apple Mail macOS

Preview



Reading

Replying

# Webmails - conclusion

	Preview	Reading details	Replying
SOGGo (no punycode implemented?) @shiva2.inverse 202201181158	✓	✓	✓
Office 365	✗	✓	✓
Tutanota	✗	✓	✓
Protonmail	✗	✓	✓
Mailfence	✗	✓	✓
Skiff	✗	✗	✗
Roundcube	✗	✗	✗
Nextcloud Mail app	✗	✗	✗
Gmail	✗ ✗	✗ ✗	✗ ✗

# Desktop mail clients - conclusion

	Preview	Reading details	Replying
Thunderbird	✓	✓	✓
Apple Mail macOS	✗	✓	✓
Windows 10 Mail	✗	✓	✓
Outlook	✗	✗	✗

# Mobile mail clients - conclusion

	Preview	Reading details	Replying
Apple Mail iOS	✓	✓	✓
K9	✓	✓	—
Proton	✗	✗	✓
Canary iOS	✗	✗	✓
Canary Android	✗	✗	✗
Gmail Android	✗ ✗	✗ ✗	✗ ✗

# How to patch/protecc/prevent?

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# Client side protection

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## In browsers

- Firefox, Chrome, Safari, Internet Explorer all have some kind of protection. For some domains or for some alphabets that should not be mixed, they show the raw URI, not the Unicode one. It is not perfect. At all.
- Browsers extensions will show you phishing attempts with homograph attacks if the domain name is well known. But some extensions are better than others...

## In mail clients

- A lot of mail clients don't care about punycode. Or does stupid things (hello |V|1cr0\$0f7).

## Problem

- Depends on the user...
- And require sensibilizing users, right now before its too late.

# Client side protection

---




## Attention : faux site

Les pirates informatiques tentent parfois d'imiter des sites en modifiant l'URL de façon subtile pour que le changement passe inaperçu.

### Chrome – Avast

- Looks like a browser error.
- Clear message.


# Client side protection



## Firefox – PunyCode Domain Detector

- Red square in address bar
- Big unmissable and clear pop-up

# Client side protection




## Chrome – PunyCode Domain Detector

- Red square in address bar, you have to click on it to see details..
- Not enough for people to understand
- A LOT WORSE than the same Firefox version...

# Client side protection

---



## Chrome – Punyfix

- You CAN'T miss the banner ;)
- The tab is automatically closed in 10 seconds.
- A bit hardcore, but it works®.

# Registry side protection

---

## TLD

- ccTLDs should only accept correct alphabets for the country, not more than that.
  - Just like .pđ only allowing cyrillic alphabet, not more.
  - AFNIC is doing a good job for that, it is really limiting the possibilities for attackers.
- Maybe some alphabets mixing could be banned, as not compatible with each other. But it may not protect from all homograph attacks...

## Problem

- For some TLDs, it's a bit late. And they are too permissive with allowed Unicode chars.

# Domain owner side protection

---

## Monitoring, monitoring, monitoring

- Some python scripts try to search for known domain names close to yours:
  - Github: dnstwist
  - Github: urlcrazy
- You can also pay a private company for this service:
  - like Nameshield (not linked or affiliated),
  - OVH (not linked or affiliated),
  - or WhoisXMLAPI (not linked or affiliated).

## Problem

- Everybody monitors, right?

# Laws and international cooperation

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## On a national level

- National laws should prevent malicious IDN homograph attacks.
  - But still allow exceptions, like parody, right to inform, etc. where applicable.


## About international cooperation

- We are all in this together, so we shall unite.
  - Europe may be about to lift GDPR restrictions on Domain Name Whois for example, may be a great start for us, ITSec people to track down illegal use and report them to authorities...
- Spread the word, people!



# Conclusion

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# Conclusion

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## It's time to spread the word.


- Please spread the word around you, to warn people about this technique, and protection via browser plug-ins.
- I bet a rakija bottle that in no more than 5 years, these kind of attacks will be prevalent. Let's be ready.

## Special thanks to:

- *BalCCon orga team*: you're the best 
- *Fred Crypto* and *jusk*: for the bad and good advices ;)
- *You*, for listening to me talking :D

# Question time...?

---



These slides are now available on fladnaG.net 😊  
This is the end. See you at the bar 😊  
IDNs and its possible bad uses

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fladnaG (Max)    French independent Pentester/Sysadmin    BalCCon 2k22

@fladna9 on Twitter

pro@fladnag.net



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